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HETEROGENEOUS MOTIVATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD - LEVEL COCA 
GROWING AREAS: THE CASE OF AN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY IN PERU 
 
Jaqueline Garcia - Yi 
 
Abstract 
There is a great deal of heterogeneity among coca growers in Peru, a fact that the national 
organizations and international co-operation have recognized, but has not been able to address 
property in anti-drug policy design. In this paper, we investigate the joint decision to grow 
coca and the decision of the quantity of coca bushes to cultivate, first under a homogeneity 
assumption, and then relaxing this assumption to allow for heterogeneity. Our research results 
support the notion of coca grower heterogeneity, identify the differences between groups of 
coca growers, and suggest different anti-drug policies, based on their effects in each group. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Coca is a native bush from the Amazon rainforest in South America. In Peru and Bolivia, the 
leaves of this bush have been traditionally used for many purposes since around 3000 B.C. 
(Rivera et al., 2005) until today. Those traditional uses include coca chewing and coca tea 
drinking  to  overcome  fatigue,  hunger  and  thirst,  and  to  relieve  “altitude  sickness”  and 
stomachache  symptoms,  respectively  (Rospigliosi,  2004).  Since  the  1970s,  however,  coca 
cultivation skyrocketed to be used as raw material for the production of cocaine, an illegal 
drug, first in Peru and Bolivia, and then in Colombia (Caulkins et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 
2001). Currently, Colombia’s coca areas represent 48%, Peru’s 34%, and Bolivia’s 18% of 
the total extension under cultivation worldwide, amounting to 167,600 hectares (UNODC, 
2009). In general, growing coca for narcotrafficking business is a profitable activity. The farm 
income of a coca growing farmer has been calculated to be 54% higher than the income of a 
non coca growing farmer (Davalos, Bejarano and Correa, 2008). 
 
Consequently, coca-related research became oriented towards evaluating the profitability of 
coca  versus  other  cash  crops  (see,  e.g.  Gibson  and  Godoy,  1993;  Torrico,  Pohlan,  and 
Janssens, 2005). Different attempts were made to replace coca by alternative crops, but it has 
been  generally  established  that  crop  substitution  as  anti-drug  policy  has  been  a  failure 
(UNODC, 2001). There is not an economic uni-causal explanation of coca cultivation. Many 
households  have been  found  to  abandon  coca  growing  despite  their  reported  unassailable   2
profitability and many other have not even after getting access to relatively equal income 
opportunities (Mansfield, 1999). In reality, farmers’ rationality is broader and more complex 
than a simple comparison of the current or potential crops’ income (Bedoya, 2003). Decision 
makers and researchers have recognized that there could exist other relevant determinants of 
coca growing beyond economic profitability such as social capital, saving account functions, 
financial reserve for large expenses, availability of labor, ecological degradation, and law 
enforcement perceptions (Bedoya, 2003; Mansfield, 1999; Mansfield, 2006; Thoumi, 2003).  
 
There has been a lack of research aimed at identifying the multiple conditions and priorities 
that  farmers  take  into  account  when  making  decisions  about  their  involvement  in  coca 
cultivation  (Mansfield,  2006).  The  temptation  has  too  often  been  to  pursue  significant 
reductions in coca  cultivation without any  clear understanding of how this might best be 
achieved  (ibid).  Consequently,  many  anti-drug  programs  fail,  but  not  because  of 
mismanagement or miscalculation; rather, due to the little understanding on the part of policy-
makers of the motivations of coca farmers and the reasons behind their dependence on coca 
cultivation (Lupu, 2004).  Indeed, the needs and priorities of coca growers, and the disparate 
factors that influence household coca cultivation have not been adequately accounted in anti-
drug project design (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). 
 
In Peru, as well as in Bolivia, the study of the motivations underneath coca cultivation gets 
additionally  complex  because  of  the  dichotomy  coca  and  cocaine.  Coca  has  become  an 
important  focal  symbol  in  the  indigenous  struggle  for  self-determination  (Office  of 
Technology  Assessment,  1993).  Coca  “yes”,  cocaine  “no”  constitutes  the  slogan  of 
indigenous people to fight this struggle (Henman, 1990). This formulation is of great political 
attraction, given that it tries to clearly separate traditional uses (“coca”) from narcotrafficking 
(“cocaine”). Traditional uses such as coca chewing are ethnicity symbols (Allen, 1981) and 
their persistence could be related to nationalism feelings in Peru (Henman, 1990). Hence, 
coca  growing  per  se  is  not  illegitimate  in  Peru,  as  a  result  of  the  social  awareness  and 
acceptance of traditional uses of this plant (UNODC, 2001)
 1. 
 
                                                 
1 In contrast, coca cultivation is illegal in Colombia, which reflects the lack of traditional uses in this country. 
Bolivia presents a joint situation in which the legality of coca cultivation is not generic and is restricted to few 
traditional areas. On the other hand, the trade of cocaine, a coca leaf derivative, is forbidden by law in all those 
three countries (UNODC, 2001).    3
This dichotomy has implications for the formulation and implementation of anti-drug policies 
and raises concerns about to the unintended consequences that those policies could have on 
traditional users. For example, politicians who are in favor of “zero coca cultivation” policies 
have been subject of a strong opposition by social intellectuals interested in indigenous reality 
(Henman, 1990). Certainly, one of the most important things to recognize is that coca growers 
are not a homogenous group. Their motivations, their economic and social status could vary 
enormously  (Gerhardus,  2003),  particularly  in  regions  where  traditional  (mostly  self 
consumption) and commercial (larger scale) coca growers coexist like in Peru. Consequently, 
anti-drug  policies  need  to  be  aware  of  this  differentiation  and  target  their  initiatives 
accordingly.  An  ideal  anti-drug  policy  would  show  respect  to  traditional  oriented  coca 
cultivation,  but  would  enforce  non  coca  production  for  narcotraffic  business.  The  main 
limitation is that in most cases it is not possible to know a – priori the final destination of the 
coca planted by the farmers. Consequently, most of the time anti-drug policies have been 
uniform and are supposed to target a “representative” coca grower.  
 
This  paper  investigates  farmers’  motivations  to  grow  coca,  first  considering  them  as 
homogenous group. The homogenous evaluation consists on a standard probit model and a 
double hurdle or Cragg model for the joint modelling of the decision to grow coca and the 
decision of the quantity of coca bushes to cultivate. Then, the homogeneity assumption is 
relaxed with a latent class specification model. The latter approach provides an opportunity to 
include unobserved heterogeneity in the study by separating farmers in two groups, and to 
allow the assessment of potential impacts of anti-drug programs on different types of coca 
growers.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: literature review about coca growing in Peru, the 
theoretical economic frameworks used for explaining coca growing decisions, and our main 
hypotheses are presented in section 2; the study area, data, and methodology are described in 
section 3; econometric results and policy recommendations are indicated in section 4; and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
This literature review focuses on the background information about traditional coca uses in 
Peru, which is of particular interest in the context of this article. Then, the theoretical models 
and  related  empirical  studies  which  reflect  the  main  motivations  for  coca  growing  are   4
presented, along with our hypotheses related to coca growing for traditional and commercial – 
oriented coca cultivation. 
 
2.1  Background Information about Traditional Coca Uses in Peru 
There are two main reasons for growing coca in Peru. The first one is for traditional uses, and 
the second one is to supply narcotraffic business
2 (FONANPE, 2005). Even though traditional 
users account for 20% of the Peruvian population above 12 years old (Rospigliosi, 2004), the 
percentage of coca derived to them is believed to be 10% of the quantity of coca leaves 
produced in Peru – a total of 122,300 metric tons (FONANPE, 2005; UNODC, 2009). One of 
the reasons for this divergence is that the cocaine content on coca leaves is normally below 
1%, ranging between 0.13 to 0.86% (Holmstedt et al., 1977). Consequently, narcotraffickers 
need  very large  quantities  of  those  leaves  to be  able  to  obtain  enough  of  the  alkaloid to 
commercialize it in the illegal market. 
 
In particular, traditional uses refer to the customary consumption or utilization of coca leaves. 
In Peru, coca chewing is the main traditional use (Rospigliosi, 2004). Coca chewing is almost 
exclusively done by indigenous populations, who suggest physiological reasons underneath 
this custom such as (Bolton, 1976): (1) providing energy for work and reducing fatigue, (2) 
keeping them warm, and (3) helping to alleviate hunger. On the other hand, there is empirical 
evidence of non euphoric effects or addictive symptoms among coca chewers (Hanna, 1974; 
Bolton, 1976; South, 1977). This is indirectly supported by the Sauvain et al. (1997) who 
found that coca chewers’ preference for “sweet” coca leaves is not related with their cocaine 
content.  Moreover,  traditional  users  do  not  consume  coca  leaves  in  quantities  sufficient 
enough to extract the amount of cocaine that could generate negative psychological effects 
(Weil, 1981).  
 
Additional  traditional  coca  uses  include  elaborating  coca  leaf  powder  or  tea  to  combat 
toothache, stomach ulcers, rheumatism, asthma, and malaria. In particular, coca tea is a home-
made remedy for the nausea, dizziness, and headache of soroche or altitude sickness. The 
juice from the chewed leaf can also be applied to eye to soothe irritation, or gargled for sore 
throat (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1981). Coca tea is drunk by urban and rural population of 
different ethnic backgrounds and social classes in Peru. In industrial form, coca tea is often 
packaged in individual servings as tea bags which contain approximately 1g of dried coca leaf 
                                                 
2 Industrial uses (for example coca tea bag elaboration) could be considered a third reason for growing coca, but 
these uses represent a very small percentage (0.18%) of the total coca leaf production (FONANPE, 2005).   5
(Jenkins et al., 1996). Unfortunately, well controlled experiments on the metabolic effects of 
coca leaves are practically non existent (Burczynski et al., 1986).  
 
In total, all traditional users consume an estimated of 6550 metric tons of dried coca leaves 
per  year.  Coca  chewing  users  and  coca  tea  consumers  are  64%  and  31%  of  the  total 
consumers, respectively. Other coca users (e.g. people who use coca leaves as offering to 
Gods during indigenous religious ceremonies and divination) account for the remaining 5% 
(Rospigliosi, 2004) (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Traditional Coca Uses in Peru 
Traditional use  Number of coca users  Kg of coca consumed  Kilograms per 
person per year  Total  Percentage  Total  Percentage 
Coca chewing  2019574  64.0  6362341  97.1  3.15 
Coca tea  964776  30.6  165020  2.5  0.17 
Other uses  169538  5.4  23654  0.4  0.14 
Own elaboration. Source: Rospigliosi (2004) 
 
Actually, it terms of total quantity, it is only a small percentage of the Peruvian population 
(5%) who use most of the amount of coca (78%). Those are the habitual coca chewers, who 
use the leaves between 1 to 7 times per week. Ten percent of the population is occasional 
chewers and employs 19% of coca leaf, while 5% of the population utilizes 3% of the coca in 
tea and in the other traditional uses mentioned above (Rospigliosi, 2004). 
 
In addition, according to the results of a survey conducted at national level, the majority of 
traditional coca users are mainly people who live in the Andes (77% of the total traditional 
users) with a low level of education (52% only have elementary education), and of indigenous 
ascent (50% speaks Quechua or Aymara versus 16% of the non coca users) (DEVIDA, 2004).  
 
2.2  Economic Theory Frameworks explaining Farmer Decisions 
Common  indigenous  farmers’  rationale  is  to  construct  a  diversification  portfolio  which 
consists on a dominant cash crop such as coffee, and other additional cash crops of secondary 
importance. Those later cash crops are used as insurance in case of low prices or temporal 
productivity  problems  on  the  dominant  crop  (Camino,  1984).  Thus,  coca  is  never  mono-
cropped, despites its economic relevance as part of farmers’ income. Even in the VRAE, one   6
of the main coca growing regions in Peru, farmers have a portfolio of agricultural products, 
including other cash crops. Farmers’ strategy consists on maintaining small coca areas while 
increasing legal crop extensions (Bedoya, 2003; Rodriguez, 2003). In this region, 84.3% of 
the farmers had coca areas between 0.1 and 0.5 Hectares. Even in this small extension, coca 
provides 42% of the farmer’s income (Rodriguez, 2003).  
 
On  the  other  hand,  indigenous  farmers  have  highly  elaborated  family  and  fictive  kinship 
networks, which help them e.g. to gather large amounts of reciprocal labor (Ayni) when the 
resources of an individual domestic unit are not sufficient to perform particular agricultural 
tasks (Collins, 1984). The current inhabitants of coca growing regions in the rainforest are 
mostly migrants from the highlands of Peru. In the highlands or sierra, indigenous farmers are 
generally agro-pastoralists who rely on exchange patterns and support networks organized by 
community  ties  for  obtaining  goods  and  labor  (Collins,  1986).  This  typical  Sierra 
community’s social organization has its roots in pre-Columbian times and has proved to be 
very resistance to change, even after over 400 years of European influence (Brush, 1976). 
Many of those who immigrate to coca growing regions tend to maintain the same type of 
social structures and mechanisms that they have learned in the Sierra (Bedoya, 1987).  
 
Thus,  it  is  expected  that  the  farmers  based  their  choice  to  grow  coca  or  not  and  the 
corresponding extension of coca  areas on frameworks that combine agricultural producer, 
consumer  and  labor  decisions  such  as  agricultural  household  models.  At  the  same  time, 
indigenous people decisions seem to be at least partially influenced by pro – social behaviors, 
given their acts that demonstrate senses of empathy and cooperation inside their community. 
Pro-social preference models try to explain those particular behaviors. Coca growing is not 
illegal in Peru, but farmers could be subject of forced eradication programs. At such, coca 
growing could be a risky activity to the farmer. Models of crime and punishment focus on 
analyze those conducts. The three types of theoretical models considered in our research – 
agricultural  household  models,  pro  –  social  behaviors,  and  crime  models  -  and  related 
empirical research are explained below. The explanation is followed by our main hypotheses 
in this research. 
 
2.2.1  Agricultural Household Decisions   7
In a simplified agricultural household model (Singh, Squire, and Strauss; 1986), households 
make  a  joint  decision  about  consumption,  production,  and  labor.  A  given  household 
maximizes the following utility function: 
  U = U(Xa, Xm, Xl)            (1) 
where the commodities are the agricultural staple (Xa), a market purchased good (Xm), and 
leisure (Xl). Utility is maximized subject to a cash income (I) constraint: 
I = pmXm = pa(Q-Xa) – w(L-F)        (2) 
where Pm and Pa are the prices of the market-purchased commodity and staples, respectively; 
Q is the household’s production of agricultural staples, and thus,  (Q-Xa) is the marketed 
surplus; w is the market wage; L is total labour input; and F is family labour input.  
 
The basic model can be extended to allow a multi-crop household production (Singh and 
Subramanian, 1986). The multi-crop model allows to consider the trade-offs among different 
types of crops (in our case, coffee, coca, and staples). In this extended model, farmers are 
assumed to maximize its utility function subject to a land constraint by quality or type (for 
example, lowland, upland) and a combined income and time constraint. In general, under this 
type  of  models,  farmers  base  their  agricultural  decisions  on  agricultural  production  and 
consumption,  family  and  external  labour,  and  land  characteristics.  In  our  research,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  farmers  with  smaller  total  and  coffee  land areas,  lower  quality  of land 
(measured as perceived soil quality and land slope), less availability of labor, lower quality or 
price  of  coffee  (non  organic  versus  organic),  and  located  further  to  the  road  (higher 
transaction costs) will be more likely to grow coca. 
 
2.2.2  Pro – Social Behavior 
Pro – social behavior economic theory models try to explain why people no behave according 
to narrow self – interest. For instance, most people pay their taxes or vote in elections, and 
many preserve common pool resources, actions that can not be explained by strict economic 
self – interest axioms (see e.g. Anesi, 2008; Ostrom, 1990). In our case, even if the probability 
of eradication is low, many farmers located in coca growing regions do not cultivate coca. 
Differences in risk aversion could surely play a role in those decisions (see, e.g. Ibanez and 
Carlsson, 2009), but in indigenous communities with close social relationship ties, this fact 
could be also partially explained by pro-social behavior.  
   8
Meier (2006) indicates that there are three important sets of pro-social behavior theories: 
outcome – based pro – social preference models, approaches that focus on the relevance of 
self – identity, and theories based on norms of reciprocity. The first group of theories is an 
extended version of the self-interested model. For example, donations may be driven by a 
desire  to  signal  wealth  (e.g.  Harbaugh,  1998).  Under  those  theories,  people  behave  pro-
socially to get an external reward. The other two sets of theories are explained as follows: 
 
a) Identity 
Identity or the people’s conception of who they are, and of who they choose to be, might 
affect economic outcomes. Akerlof  and Kranton (2000) argue that identity is the missing 
element that helps to explain why people - facing the same economic and social incentives - 
make different choices. In every cultural context, people have a notion of who they are, which 
is associated with beliefs about how they and others are supposed to behave. These notions 
play important roles in the representation of their economic decisions and tastes. Violating the 
prescriptions evokes anxiety and discomfort. 
 
In our case study, coca chewing is governed by clearly defined rules of etiquette for handling 
and sharing. As this etiquette is prescribed by indigenous cultural tradition, adherence to it 
implies the presentation of oneself as a participant in this tradition. Thus, the act of chewing 
coca leaves is an unequivocal statement of cultural loyalties. Coca chewing identifies one as 
an indigenous person (Allen, 1981). Coca chewing should be approached as a core part of the 
indigenous  society  and,  therefore,  as  a  symbol  of  ethnic  identity.  In  Peru,  where  social 
stratification and upwards mobility exist, coca chewing is viewed as a symbol of “inferior” 
social standing (Negrete, 1978). According to Mayer (2004), given that chewing coca is a 
stigma,  indigenous  people  use  it  to  openly  challenge  discrimination.  In  this  way,  they 
recognize the solidarity and brotherhood links among indigenous populations. Therefore, coca 
chewing is a powerful symbol of identity and separates clearly who is indigenous person and 
who is not.  
 
Identity markers, such as coca chewing, could help to explain coca growing only for self-
consumption  or  traditional  uses  among  the  group  of  farmers  who  identify  themselves  as 
indigenous, but not among the commercial oriented coca growers. Other related markers that 
could negative influence coca growing include identification of the farmers as coffee growers 
in contrast to as coca growers (measurable as proud of being coffee farmer) and being born   9




This set of theories is concerned with intentions that lead other people to their choices (Meier, 
2006).  Reciprocity  in  this  context  occurs  when  individuals  act  in  a  pro-social  manner  in 
response to friendly behaviors of others and in an antagonistic way in response to unfriendly 
behaviors. In a research study by Fong (2001), people preferred more redistribution to the 
poor if they believed that their individual level poverty was caused by circumstances beyond 
their control. In contrast, people who believed that the poor did little to escape poverty were 
more  likely  against  redistribution.  This could reflect partially the respondents’ reciprocity 
sense of fairness: if the poor don’t give or try to give their share to society, they should not 
receive  aid.  Other  empirical  research  provides  evidence  that  reciprocity  affects  economic 
outcomes, such as the studies of voluntary contributions in national parks (Alpizar, Carlsson 
and Johansson-Stenmann, 2008), adoption of conservation practices by farmers (Marshall, 
2009), and quality performance of markets for goods (Huck and Tyran, 2007). 
 
In our case study, indigenous farmers have social mechanisms inside their communities which 
include Ayni (exchange of labour days) and Minka (a meal or goods in exchange for a labour 
day).  Those  systems  are  heavily  based  on  reciprocity  (Larme,  1998).  Ayni  is  a  straight 
exchange of labor, while Minka involves a purely nonmonetary payment. In fact, some hired 
agricultural workers receive a substantial fraction of their daily remuneration in goods or 
services (Jacoby, 1992). In both activities, coca is offered to their guesses or it is used as 
monetary payment (Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1989). These networks of exchange 
could help to explain coca cultivation for traditional uses. Farmers who are involve in Ayni 
and Minka could be more prone to grow coca to offer it to their guesses to facilitate this 
exchange. Hence, coca is a “lubricant” that easy interactions in any social activity among 
indigenous population (Bolton, 1976). Consequently, Ayni and farmer’s sense of obligation to 
offer coca to their guesses could be used to as indicators of pro-social behaviour, and those 
participants in these traditions could be also less oriented to commercial coca growing as a 
reflection of their reciprocity with other members of the community. 
 
2.2.3  Crime and Punishment Model   10
The  Crime  and  Punishment  model  (Becker,  1968;  Ehrlich,  1973)  is  a  standard  economic 
model of choice under uncertainty between legal and illegal activities. A farmer would choose 
between them by comparing the expecting utility associated with each one. In this model, the 
optimal allocation mix allows for varying degrees of participation in legal and illegitimate 
activities.  Following  Ehrlich  (1973),  the  farmer  participates  in  two  market  activities:  i  a 
(pseudo) illegal one (coca growing) and l a legal one (coffee cultivation). Coffee cultivation 
(l) is safe. Its net returns are given with certainty, by the function Wl(tl), where t is the time 
input. On the other hand, coca growing (i) is risky. Its net returns are conditional to two states 
of the world: (a) eradication at the end of the period, with subjective probability pi; and (b) 
not being eradicated, with probability 1 – pi. If coca is eradicated, the farmers net returns are 
reduced by an amount Fi(ti). Thus, in the state of the world (a), where the farmer’s coca is 
eradicated, the earnings are:   
  Xa=W’+Wi(ti)-Fi(ti)+Wl(tl)       
with probability pi. On the other hand, in the state of the world (b), where the farmer gets 
lucky and his coca is not eradicated, the earnings are: 
  Xb=W’+Wi(ti) +Wl(tl)         
where W’ is the market value of the farmer’s assets. 
The  model  of  choice  between  legal  and  illegal  activities  can  be  formulated  within  the 
framework of the economic theory of choice under uncertainty. The farmer’s expected utility 
is given by: 
  EU(Xs, tc) = (1-pi)U(Xb,tc)+piU(Xa,tc)     
 
Thus, under this theoretical framework, farmer's participation in coca cultivation is explained 
by the opportunity cost of the illicit activity (earnings from coffee), factors that influence the 
returns  to  coca  cultivation  (the  probability  of  forced  eradication),  and  by  tastes  and 
preferences for the illegal activity. Risk aversion is also central in the economic models of 
criminal choice. For example, if the farmer is risk averse then he will respond more to the 
changes in the chances of forced eradication than less risk adverse farmers.  
 
Extensions  of  the  basic  economic  model  of  crime  include  social  capital  as  important 
predictors of criminal behavior (see e.g. Williams and Sickles, 2002). In the particular case of 
coca  growing,  Ibanez  and  Carlsson  (2009)  extended  the  crime  and  punishment  model 
suggesting that morality or the intrinsic motivation to do the “right thing” help to explain why 
some farmers decide not grow coca in the Putumayo region in Colombia. Deviating from   11
what is considered to be right creates a sense of sinfulness or guilt and could be included as 
arguments  in  farmers’  utility  functions,  after  weighting  it  according  to  individual  moral 
concerns  (Eisenhauer,  2004).  In  addition,  they  considered  that  for  some  individuals  no 
respecting the law or authorities could create an internal sense of disappointment (see Tyler, 
1990). Thus, compliance with no coca growing law in Colombia could depend on legitimacy 
or  acceptance  of  related  laws  and  authorities  by  the  farmers.  In  their  study,  Ibanez  and 
Carlsson (2009) found that farmers with a high degree of acceptance of the authorities and the 
law were less likely to cultivate coca. On the other hand, the level of moral development was 
not significant in explaining the likelihood to cultivate coca.  
 
Our hypotheses  are that risk aversion, perceived probability of eradication, importance to 
obey the law, and morality have a negative effect on coca growing for the commercial coca 
farmers. With respect to morality this aspect was measured by:  
a) Religious beliefs. This characteristic provides a system of internal moral monitoring that 
encourages individuals to behave in way that benefit society (Owen and Videras, 2007) 
b) Frequency to attendance to religious meetings. Involvement in a church group was found to 
be positively and strongly correlated with for example tax morale (Torgler, 2006) 
a) A constructed index of morality based on three parameters: degree of believed damage of 
coca growing to the community; degree of believed damage of coca growing to the overall 
society; and believing that coca growing is morally incorrect. Each of them was calculated on 
a scale from 0 (low) to 2 (high). 
 
2.2.4  Additional Factors Beyond the Profit Maximization Rationale 
Additional  potential  motivations  for  coca  growing  that  need  consideration  are  related  to 
production diversification portfolio, coca ability to function as a saving account crop and a 
financial resource for large expenses, and social capital. Those potential causes are explained 
below. 
 
a) Production Diversification Portfolio and Risk Aversion 
Some farmers seem to find that including coca in their agricultural production diversification 
portfolio can reduce their overall income insecurity. Coca can be harvested several times per 
year (among 1 to 5 times). If the farmer loses one harvest due to pests or climatic conditions, 
one of the following harvests in the same year can surely provide income (Mansfield, 1999). 
In contrast, coffee and cacao, the main alternative crops in Peru, can only be harvested once   12
per year. If they lose their legal crop due to one of the many agricultural uncertainties, they 
could face very strong money shortages and even famine. Perhaps not other single crop rather 
than coca can provide farmers with a continue supply of income along the year (Lupu, 2004). 
 
Thus, contrary to what the crime and punishment model would predict with respect to risk 
aversion (see above) –risk adverse people showing low propensity to get involved in illegal 
activities (Becker, 1968) - , it could be the case that farmers who are risk adverse are more 
prone to grow coca. In addition, Revilla (1993) suggests that growing coca is less risky than 
growing legal crops. The uncertainty related with being able to sell the final product to good 
prices gets reduced. We hypothesize that coca growing could be therefore appealing for risk 
adverse farmers but for the traditional coca group.  
 
b) Inter-temporal Transactions 
Farmers  need  money  to  finance  future  foreseeable  and  not  foreseeable  events.  In  coca 
growing areas, in general, there are no financial institutions that could lend cash to them. It is 
belief that coca is important for farmers to obtain the needed economic resources for inter-
temporal events. Thus, coca plays two specific inter-temporal roles: 
 
- Saving Account for Small Monetary Emergencies 
Coca income is used when farmers urgently need cash during an emergency (for example 
accidents or diseases which are common in the upper rainforest areas). Given that coca is a 
perennial  evergreen  bush,  it  is  possible  to  harvest  it  any  time  farmers  urgently  need  to 
supplement their income, although the yields and prices might vary according to the season. 
In this sense, coca represents the farmers’ “cash box”, and it functions as a saving account to 
face small monetary emergencies (Bedoya, 2003; Cabieses, 2005). 
 
- Financial Reserve for Large Expenses 
Indigenous farmers have social obligations that require significant cash expenditures. Those 
obligations include such as sponsoring a fiesta or holding large wedding festivities (Painter, 
1984). It is believed that farmers plan ahead their extension of coca to obtain the income they 
need to finance those large expenses. In particular occasions, the income from coca is also 
used to finance the increment of legal crop areas such as coffee (Bedoya, 2003). 
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Thus, we hypothesized that planning to extent coffee areas, having debt, and having hold a 
compulsory celebration positively influence coca growing. 
 
c) Social Capital 
Social capital refers to the “(individual) ability to obtain resources through networks and other 
social structures” (Portes and Landolt, 2000: 534). Thoumi (2003) suggest that social capital 
could influence coca related decisions, but he indicates that social capital of some groups can 
be detrimental to others. Perverse social capital could be present in the Colombian society 
which perpetuates reward systems that inspire rent-seeking or criminal behavior.  
 
Ibanez and Carlsson (2008) researched the determinants for coca growing in Colombia. They 
argue  that  the  regions  where  coca  is  cultivated  in  Colombia  have  a  recent  history  of 
colonization, which can imply weak social networks and mechanisms of social control. They 
found that social capital (measured as trust and participation in communitarian organizations) 
has no clear effect on the decision to grow coca. Trust has a positive and participation in 
communitarian organizations has a negative effect, but neither is significant in explaining 
individual–level coca cultivation decisions. On the other hand, Balbin (2002) evaluated coca 
growers who received alternative development assistance in Peru. The data was collected by 
the Governmental organization DEVIDA that provided the assistance during the years 1998-
2001. His results suggest that participation in communal activities had a significantly positive 
influence on the likelihood to abandon coca cultivation during the year 1998. His results for 
the years 1999 to 2001 indicate that this variable had a positive but not significant influence.  
 
3.  Study Area, Data, and Methodology 
This section starts with a description of the study area, as well as the procedures for data 
collection and sample representativeness evaluation. Finally, the econometric methodologies 
used in the evaluation are explained. 
 
3.1  Study Area 
The research area is located in the Upper Tambopata valley, one of the most remote and 
difficult to access Amazon rainforest areas in Peru (UNODC Office in Peru, 1999). The entire 
population of the upper Tambopata valley is composed of immigrants, especially descendants 
from the Aymara indigenous population. Aymara is a native ethnic group originally from the 
Andes and Altiplano regions of South America. At the beginning, most of the farmers were   14
seasonal immigrants who used to leave their Sierra subsistence plots for only three to six 
months every year, and make the 320 km journey to the upper Tambopata valley to produce 
coffee as cash crop on their individually owned agricultural plots (Collins, 1984). Over time, 
farmers have become mostly permanent settlers in the upper Tambopata valley (ibid). 
 
Before 1989, coca cultivation in the upper Tambopata valley was very limited. Small–scale 
coca production was aimed at self consumption or was restricted to minor sales for traditional 
uses to Andean farmers and miners. After 1989, coca cultivation was intensified, but mostly 
in the neighboring upper Inambari valley, that did not respond to any changes in demand by 
own or external traditional users (UNODC Office in Peru, 1999). Coca from those valleys has 
lower acceptance for traditional chewing than coca from Cuzco region due to its bitterness 
(Caballero et al., 1998). In particular, the potential increase of coca cultivation specifically in 
the  upper  Tambopata  valley  was  observed  by  Malaga  (2003)  who  reported  about  the 
expressed  willingness  of  some  farmers  in  this  valley  to  intensify  their  coca  production 
although  they  knew  this  crop  represents  a  very  insecure  alternative.  Bonnard  and  David 
(2004) mentioned that farmers have started to produce coca due to coffee price variability and 
permanent settlers’ almost unique dependency on coffee as cash crop. During the last years, 
large  increases  in  coca  cultivation  in  the  upper  Tambopata  valley  have  been  consistently 
reported by the United Nations (UN), as observed in Table 1. The percentage variation per 
year in the upper Tambopata valley is above the annual change of around 4% at national level. 
 
Table 2: Coca Cultivation in the Upper Tambopata Valley (2005-2008) 
Year  Hectares 
Percentage of variation  
in relation to previous year 
2005  253  - 
2006  377  49.0 
2007  863  128.9 
2008  940  8.9 
Source: Own calculation using data from UNODC (2009b) 
 
It is believed that the coca provided by the upper Tambopata valley and upper Inambari valley 
supplies cross boarding trade associations between Peruvian and Bolivian narcotraffickers. 
Bolivia remains the world's third largest producer of cocaine, and it is a significant transit 
zone for Peruvian-origin cocaine (US Department of State, 2009). In this sense, those valleys 
constitute a strategic coca production area for both Peruvian and Bolivian narcotraffickers due 
to their proximity to an external exit route (UNODC Office in Peru, 1999). Coca leaves are   15
not transformed into cocaine in the agricultural plots. Narcotraffickers take advantage of the 
fact that large quantity of coca leaves are transported to major cities apparently to be sold to 
traditional users by informal marketers. So, they buy part of this coca and process it in hidden 
places in major cities near the border to Bolivia. In this way, they diversify their risk of being 
caught.  From  Bolivia,  cocaine  is  dispatched  to  Brazil  and  Europe  (Garcia  and  Antezana, 
2009). 
 
3.2  Data 
A feasibility study to test if farmers would answer coca-related questions was conducted in 
December, 2007. The pilot study for the designed questionnaire took place during May, 2008, 
and the final survey was conducted during June to August, 2008. The feasibility and pilot 
studies and the final survey were addressed to the farmers located in San Pedro de Putina 
Punco (SPPP), the district inside the upper Tambopata valley which is located in the deepest 
rainforest.  All  the  farmers  in  the  research  area  produce  coffee  as  cash  crop  and  some 
supplement their income with coca cultivation. There are five coffee co-operatives in SPPP. 
Farmers have to become a member in one of those co-operatives in order to be able to sell 
their coffee, because restrictions to coffee intermediaries are in place. The final survey was 
conducted  only  among  the  members  of  four  of  those  co-operatives  because  most  of  the 
members  of  the  remaining  co-operative  are  based  in  San  Juan  del  Oro,  a  district  not 
considered in the scope of the research.  
 
A convenience sampling was applied, although at the end of the survey, we asked the farmers 
for their co-operative registration number to be able to infer the sampling representativeness 
from the co-operative registration lists. To guarantee anonymity, the co-operative registration 
number provided by the farmer was written on another piece of paper and was not attached to 
the respondent’s questionnaire. The number of valid questionnaires was 477, which represents 
around 15% of the population under study. In a simple random sample without replacement, 
after the sample size has been calculated, each farmer has the same probability to be selected 
from  the  co-operative  member  lists.  Thus,  the  co-operative  registration  numbers  obtained 
from the survey’s sample were compared with the ones selected from a simple random sample 
obtained using the co-operative lists. If the two groups do not show statistical differences in 
their distribution functions, then the survey sample would be equivalent to a simple random 
sample.  
   16
Two types of tests were used for the comparison: a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney)  test  and  a  two-sample  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  for  equality  of  distribution 
functions. The first test assesses how probable it is that the two groups come from the same 
distribution, and that differences observed are caused by chance fluctuation. The second test is 
similar to the first one, but in addition it is sensitive to differences in both, location and shape 
of the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two groups. The results of both tests 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of equality of distribution between the survey sample and 
random sample at a significance level of 0.05%. 
 
3.3  Methodology 
3.3.1  Standard Probit Model 
The  farmer’s  decision  to  grow  coca  can  be  represented  as  a  binary  variable,  labeled  for 
convenience y=1 and y=0, where the former refers to the decision of growing and the later to 
the decision of non growing coca. There is a set of measurable covariates, Xs, which explain 
the occurrence of one outcome or the other. The parameters to be estimated with the model 
are labeled βs. 
 
The farmers derive utility: 
U0= β0’X + e0 from choice 0, and U1= β1’X + e1 from choice 1  
 
where e0 and e1 are the individual specific, random components of the individual’s utility that  
are unaccounted for by the covariates Xs. If farmers decides to grow coca (y=1), it reveals 
that U1>U0 or 
e0 – e1 < β0’X - β1’X 
 
Let  e  =  e0  –  e1  and  β’X  =  β  0’X  -  β1’X.  Then,  the  binary  choice  model  applies  to  the 
probability that e < β’X. 
 
3.3.2  Cragg Model 
In this paper, we model the joint decision to participate in coca growing activities and the 
amount of land dedicated to this crop. The later decision could be subject to sample selection 
bias if it is analyzed independently. Sample selection bias refers to the error that arises when 
the  selection  of  those  participating  in  coca  growing  is  not  done  randomly,  but  by  the 
participants  themselves  (see  Heckman,  1979).  In  general,  there  are  three  methods  for   17
correcting sample selection bias (Breen, 1996): tobit, cragg and Heckman or sample selection 
models. Those models are related but imply different statistical assumptions. Under the tobit 
model  the  same  set  of  variables  with  the  same  coefficients  explain  both  the  decision  to 
participate and the extension of coca area cultivated. The cragg model relaxes this assumption 
allowing different coefficients for the two joint decisions. The heckman or sample selection 
models  extend  the  cragg  model  by  assuming  that  the  errors  of  those  joint  decisions  are 
correlated (ibid).  
 
In a preliminary analysis, we found that the cragg model was preferred to the tobit (with 
p=0.000) and to the heckman or sample selection model (lambda with a p=0.245). This result 
is not very unusual, and cragg models have been used in studies related to farmer decisions on 
agricultural programs (Thurow et al., 2001) and off – labour allocation decisions (Matshe and 
Young, 2004). Following Greene (2007), in the Cragg model the decision of the amount of 
land dedicated to coca (y) is: 
f(y| x)      = f(y*| x) if y*>0 
where x is a set of measurable covariates, but 
Prob (y*>0|x)    = Prob (β´x+ >0),  ~N[0,σ
2] 
      = Prob ( >-β´x) 
      = [ ] σ β / ´x Φ  
Therefore, f[y|x]  = [ ] [ ] σ β σ β φ σ / ´ / / ) ´ ( ) / 1 ( x x y Φ −  
 
Latent Class Approach  
As mentioned before, it is very likely that farmers have different preferences related to coca 
growing  decisions  (traditional  versus  commercial  –  oriented  coca  growers),  and  to  some 
extent  this  preference  heterogeneity  is  related  to  unobservable  individual  characteristics. 
Ignoring this fact induces bias and reduces the realism of the models (Heckman and Singer, 
1984). Latent class models extend the standard models by allowing the coefficients to vary 
between respondents. The latent class approach assumes there are latent classes or segments 
in the population each of which is associated with a different parameter estimates. A latent 
class model simultaneously assigns individuals to segments and infers different parameters for 
each segment. The advantage of such an approach is that hidden structures of the sample are 
thus  revealed  to  allow  an  objective  understanding  of  preference  heterogeneity  across  the 
population under study (Hope, 2006). Thus, by modeling membership of these latent classes 
jointly with the model of interest, it is possible to reduce bias from unobserved heterogeneity.   18
 
A model for a latent sorting of yi into J classes allows for heterogeneity as follows (Greene, 
2007: E):  
The density of the observed yi given that the regime j applied is 
f(i|j) = f(yi|xi,j) 
where the density is now specific to the group. The analyst does not observe directly which 
class,  j=1,…,J  generated  observation  yi|j,  and  class  membership  must  be  estimated.  This 
would produce the model 
f(i|j) = f(yi, β´xi + δj), Prob[class=j] = Fj 
This approximation more generally is, 
f(i|j) = f[yi|β´xi+δj´xi,σj], 
Fj = exp(θj)/Σj exp(θj), with θj=0 
In this formulation, each group has its own parameter vector, (βj´,σj)=(β+δj,σj). 
  
Note that latent class models are theoretically identified with cross sectional data, but they 
may be difficult to estimate. Identification of the unobserved heterogeneity is weak when the 
researcher has only cross-sectional information (Greene, 2007). In our case, it was possible to 
estimate a latent class cragg model, but not a latent class probit model. This could be related 
with the linear specification of the former model in contrast to the later model.  
 
4.  Results and Policy Recommendations 
In the following, the description of the variables used in the models is presented and main 
descriptive statistics differences between coca and non coca growers are mentioned. Then, the 
econometric models results are shown, our hypotheses are tested and discussed, and finally 
policy recommendations are suggested.  
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
The description of the variables used in the models is presented in Table 3. Coca growers 
represent 64% of the sample. They grow in average 3100 coca bushes, which would be the 
equivalent of 0.1 hectares, if we considered a conventional coca growing density of around 
35000 bushes per hectare (UNODC, 2001). This average coca area is around the range found 
in VRAE, one of the main coca growing regions in Peru, where most of the farmers self- 
reported coca areas between 0.1 to 0.5 hectares (Rodriguez, 2003).  For the same region, 
Bedoya (2003) indicated that the self – reported coca areas were of around 0.4 hectares for   19
Santa Rosa community and 0.25 hectares for Palmapampa. In our case, SPPP is a relative new 
coca growing area for narcotraffic business (UNODC Office in Peru, 1999), and it is expected 
that some farmers are only growing coca for traditional self-consumption
3.  
 
Table 3: Description of Variables 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Dependent variables 
Coca  =1 if self reported to cultivate coca  0.64  0.48 
Coca bushes  Natural log plus one of the number of self reported coca 
bushes   3.17  3.27 
Socio – Economic Characteristics 
Age  Respondent age in years  42.30  12.42 
Male  =1 if respondent is male  0.93  0.23 
Education  Respondent number of years of education  8.32  3.30 
Aymara  =1 if respondent is Aymara  0.82  0.38 
Agricultural Household Characteristics 
Coffee area  Natural log of coffee area in hectares  4.24  0.26 
Total area  Natural log of total area in hectares  6.73  4.71 
Number of children  Number of children   2.93  1.99 
Organic  =1 if respondent participates in the coffee organic 
program  0.57  0.49 
Soil quality  From 1=very low to 5=very high perception of quality of 
soil for coffee production  2.82  0.55 
Slope  From 1= if terrain is flat to 3= if terrain is sharp    2.19  0.52 
Location middle   =1 if plot is located in the middle region of valley 
  0.40  0.48 
Time to road  Time from agricultural plot to road in walking minutes  81.58  62.93 
Identity Characteristics 
Born in SPPP  =1 if respondent was born in SPPP  0.25  0.43 
Proud of being 
coffee farmer 
From 1=very low to 3=very high self reported being 
proud to be coffee farmer  2.53  0.71 
Chewing coca  =1 if farmer chews coca  0.67  0.47 
Reciprocity Behavior 
Easy to obtain 
reciprocal labor 
From 1=difficult to 3=easy to find to find reciprocal 
labor  1.86  0.91 
Obligation to offer 
coca 
=1 if the farmer feels the obligation to offer coca leaves 
to agricultural or labor guesses  0.78  0.42 
Crime and Punishment 
Risk aversion 
(a)  From 1= low to 3=high degree of risk aversion  2.12  0.68 
Law obedience  From 1=low opinion to 3=high opinion about the 
importance to obey the law  2.81  0.50 
Index of morality  From 1=very low to 3=very high index of morality   2.04  1.05 
Catholic  =1 if respondent is catholic  0.58  0.49 
Religious attendance  =1 if respondent attends religious meetings  0.56  0.50 
Fear to eradication  From 1=very low to 5=very high fear about the 
implementation of eradication programs five years ago  2.72  1.01 
Inter – Temporal Transactions 
                                                 
3 Still, there are reasons to believe that many farmers underreported their extension of coca areas, behavior that is 
predictable anytime people are asked about sensitive topics (see e.g. Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Therefore, as 
in any other research that deals with sensitive topics, the results should be treated with cautiousness.   20
Planning to increase 
coffee areas 
=1 if respondent is planning to increase their coffee areas 
in the next two years.  0.68  0.47 
Debt  =1 if respondent had debt with the co-operatives during 
the last two years.   0.10  0.29 
Celebrations  =1 if respondent had to spend money in a mandatory 
celebrations during the last two years  0.23  0.42 
Social Capital 
Trust  From 1= low trust to 3= high trust in neighbors five 
years ago  2.40  0.78 
Security  From 1= low sense of security to 3= high sense of 
security in their community five years ago  2.73  0.60 
Communal activities  =1 if farmer participated in communal activities during 
last year  0.89  0.31 
(a) The risk aversion test followed Binswanger (1980) with its setup is presented in Appendix. 
 
There are not statistically significant differences in socio – economic characteristics (age, sex, 
Aymara ethnic group, and number of children) between coca and non coca growers. Farmers 
have in average 42 years and 3 children, and 82% identified themselves as Aymara. Most of 
the respondents were males (93%), because we surveyed the head of the household who 
happen to be the male. The average years of schooling were 8.3, although the quality of 
education is very low. Non coca growers have statistically significant more years of schooling 
than coca growers.  
 
In addition, farmers have in average 8 hectares of land, of which around 2 are dedicated to 
cultivate coffee. There are not statistically significant differences in the agricultural plot total 
areas and coffee areas between coca and non coca growers. On the other hand, 57% of the 
farmers participate in the coffee organic program, and there were statistically significant more 
organic coffee producers among the coca growers than among the non coca growers. Farmers 
take in average 82 minutes to reach the road by foot. Coca growers have agricultural plots 
statistically significant nearer the road than non coca growers, and are located in lower or 
upper parts in contrast to the middle part of the valley.  
 
There is a statistically significant positive relationship between coca growing and traditional 
coca uses. A higher percentage of coca growers than non coca growers chew coca (76 versus 
53%), and feel the obligation to offer coca to agricultural or labor guesses (87 versus 63%). 
On the contrary, index of morality and law obedience were significantly larger for non coca 
growers than coca growers. There are not statistically significant differences in the place of 
birth,  feeling  proud  of  being  coffee  farmer,  difficulty  to  obtain  reciprocal  labor,  being   21
catholic, religious attendance, risk aversion, debt, planning to increase coffee areas, trust on 
neighbors or security between coca and non coca growers. 
 
4.2  Econometric Models 
The  econometric  model  results  are  shown  in  Table  4.  The  two  first  columns  present  the 
marginal effects of the probit and cragg models under the homogeneity assumption. The next 
two columns present the estimates for each of two groups obtained by the latent class cragg 
model under the heterogeneity assumption. The latent class coefficients that did not show 
statistical differences over classes as suggested by the Wald test statistics were restricted to be 
equal (e.g. Sevenant and Antrop, 2009). The econometric model results were robust under 
different specifications, and the marginal effects were evaluated at the sample mean. For the 
continuous variables in the probit model, the marginal effect is the marginal increment in the 
likelihood to grow coca associated with a marginal increment in the corresponding variable. 
For the dummy variables in the probit model, the marginal effect is the increment in the 
likelihood to grow coca associated with a discrete change from zero to one. For the cragg 
model the marginal effects are the partial derivative of the expected value of the natural log of 
number of coca bushes. The models were calculated using Limdep 9. 
 
Table 4: Econometric Results 
Variable  Probit  Cragg Model 
Latent Class Cragg Model 
Coefficients 
Traditional  Commercial 




















































































Coffee area  -0.208*  0.138  2.873***  -1.909*   22
(0.122)  (0.794)  (0.611)  (0.983) 



























































































































































Sigma  -  2.806***      





Class Probability  -  -  0.351***             0.649*** 
Log likelihood  -209.236       -571.618       -530.176 
McFadden Pseudo R-
squared       
0.1817       -  - 
AIC  1.224      3.082       2.166 
BIC  1.528       3.397       2.583      
Percentage of 
corrected predicted 
71.355  -  - 
ROC curve  77.526  -  - 
Number of 
Observations 
391  391  391 
* Significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.   23
(a) Organic certification participation could be a potential endogenous variable in the decision 
to grow coca. A series of statistical evaluations were done to test its exogeneity both in the 
probit model and in the cragg model. The significance of the correlation (ρ) in a recursive 
bivariate probit model is used to test the exogeneity of a binary variable in the probit model 
(Greene, 2007). If ρ=0, then the potential endogenous variable and the error of the probit of 
the  dependent  variable  are  uncorrelated.  In  our  case,  we  fail  to  reject  the  hypothesis  of 
exogeneity with prob=0.878. A two – step estimator of an endogenous discrete variable in a 
truncated model is used to test the exogeneity of organic certification in the Cragg model 
(following Greene, 2007: R10-44, Cameron, and Trivelli: 595). We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity with prob =0.369.  
 
4.2.1  Probit results 
The probit model results suggest that the likelihood of growing coca significantly decreases 
with education, but increases with traditional uses of coca such as coca chewing and feeling 
the obligation to offer coca to guesses. As, expected by the agricultural household models, the 
larger the coffee area, the lower the probability of growing coca, and the opposite in the case 
of the perceived quality of soil. Farmers who were more in debt with the coffee co-operative 
are also more significantly likely to grow coca. This result suggests that financial problems 
could be one of the reasons for cultivating illegal crops. Law obedience and index of morality 
have  a  statistically  significant  negative  influence  in  the  likelihood  of  growing  coca.  In 
addition, location in the middle of the valley also has a negative influence in the likelihood of 
growing coca. The effect of location could be related to social influence of the neighbors as 
suggested by Ibanez and Carlsson (2009) or due to the fact that the upper part of the valley 
has been subject to long term agricultural use, meaning that their productivity has decreased, 
and the lower part of the valley are areas further away from the major towns and therefore 
with larger transactions costs, which make farmers less competitive and more prone to coca 
growing. 
 
Unexpectedly, participation in the organic certification program, an activity promoted and 
economically and technically supported by international co-operation as an anti-drug policy 
(see Dietz et al., 2001), seems to positively influence the likelihood of coca growing. One of 
the reasons for the positive result could be that organic certification requires additional soil 
conservation activities to be practiced throughout the year, which make difficult for farmers to 
continue growing crops in the Sierra, motivating their permanent settlement in the rainforest. 
Subsistence agriculture in the Sierra has customarily acted as insurance in case of coffee cash 
crop failure in the rainforest (Collins, 1984). Farmers could have substitute agriculture in the 
Sierra with coca cultivation to act as a refuge crop in case of emergencies. The farmer’s use of 
coca as refuge crop has been suggested by Mansfield (1999) and Bedoya (2003).   24
 
Finally, in relation to the probit model results, it is important to recall that it was not possible 
to apply a latent class specification in this type of model because identification of unobserved 
heterogeneity is weak when a cross sectional dataset is used as in our case (Greene, 2007). 
The motivations for growing coca are likely to differ for traditional and commercial coca 
growers; therefore, it is likely that the standard probit model calculated with pooled data 
provides  biased  results,  given  that  it  can  not  take  into  account  two  separate  distribution 
functions. There was no manner to separate a priori those two types of coca farmers because 
for obvious reasons, they were not willing to answer questions about the final destination of 
their coca production. 
 
4.2.2  Cragg model results 
For the Cragg model, it was possible to estimate a latent class specification, probably due to 
the linear specification of this type of model in contrast to the probit model. The latent class 
model only considers two classes, because with more than two the model failed to converge. 
Even when identification is weak using cross sectional data, we consider that is better than not 
addressing the unobserved heterogeneity problem. A comparison of the standard Cragg model 
with the latent class Cragg specification results, favors the later one, based on the reduction on 
the  value  of  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion  (AIC)  and  Bayesian  Information  Criterion 
(BIC). Both, the AIC and BIC have been used as a tool for model selection under latent class 
specifications  (e.g.  Beharry-Borg  and  Scarpa,  2010;  Milon  and  Scrogin,  2006).  The 
discussion centers on the latent class Cragg model results, which was preferred to the standard 
Cragg model. In this last model, some variables show different magnitude of estimates and 
even sign reversals for the traditional and commercial groups. First, we discuss our results in 
the context of the agricultural household model framework, then in the pro-social behavior set 
of theories, and finally in the crime and punishment model framework. 
 
a)  Agricultural household model decisions 
The traditional group results partially support the hypothesis that farmers take their decisions 
under the rationale proposed in the agricultural household model. Total agricultural plot areas, 
availability  of  family  labor,  quality  of  land  and  distance  to  road  have  a  statistically 
significantly negative effect on the number of coca bushes for this group. On the contrary, for 
the commercial group, total agricultural plot area, quality of land, and lower distance to the 
road have a significant but positive effect on the number of coca bushes. This last result is the   25
opposite of what it is expected, suggesting that in the case of the commercial group, farmers 
with more resources for agricultural production will grow more number of coca bushes. Thus, 
coca growing for this last group seems not to be directly related to poverty associated to 
agricultural resource scarcity. 
 
On the other hand, coffee area has a statistically significantly positive effect in the number of 
coca bushes in the traditional group. This could be related to the fact that coca is intercropped 
with coffee, so larger areas of coffee mean more number of coca bushes, although it could be 
the case that farmers are not maintaining those coca bushes, and because coca is a weed, the 
larger number of coca bushes in relation to larger coffee areas is a natural occurrence. The 
contrary effect is observed in the case of the commercial group: the area of coffee has a 
negative and significant effect on the number of coca bushes. This result along with the one 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, suggest that this later group has a more commercial 
management of their farm by destining the better land to coca production, and balancing their 
coffee areas according to their extension of coca. 
 
Organic certification most of the time increases the prices of coffee, so it was expected that 
this  variable  had  a  negative  effect  on  the  number  of  coca  bushes.  This  variable  has  the 
expected effect on the commercial group but not in the traditional group. This could be related 
to  the  fact  mentioned  before:  organic  certification  requires  additional  soil  conservation 
activities to be practiced throughout the year, which make difficult for farmers to continue 
growing  crops  in  the  Sierra,  motivating  their  permanent  settlement  in  the  rainforest. 
Subsistence agriculture in the Sierra has customarily acted as insurance in case of coffee cash 
crop failure in the rainforest (Collins, 1984). Farmers could have substitute agriculture in the 
Sierra with coca cultivation to act as a refuge crop in case of emergencies. The farmer’s use of 
coca as refuge crop has been suggested by Mansfield (1999) and Bedoya (2003). Thus, this 
also  suggests  that  the  traditional  group  is  composed  by  farmers  who  used  to  rely  on 
subsistence crop production in the Sierra to supplement their coffee income, in contrast to the 
farmers in the commercial group. 
 
b)  Pro – Social Behavior 
Coca chewing, as an indigenous status identity variable, does not statistically influence the 
number of coca bushes cultivated in any of the two groups of farmers, although the negative 
sign indicates that coca chewers are less prone to grow more number of bushes. This could be   26
partially corroborated with the statistically significant negative effect of the Aymara variable 
on the number of coca bushes, meaning that in general, indigenous farmers would grow less 
number of coca bushes. Other identity variable included in the research is proud of being 
coffee farmer. This variable has a significant negative effect on the number of coca bushes for 
both  groups.  Those  results  are  expected,  according  to  the  identity  theory  (Akerlof  and 
Kranton,  2000):  people’s  notion  of  who  they  are,  is  associated  with  belief  of  how  they 
suppose to behave, and violating this might provoke discomfort. Thus, indigenous farmers are 
supposed to grow coca for self – consumption, but not to sell it to narcotraffic business, which 
might constraint its behavior.  
 
On the other hand, the variable born in the research area has a statistically significant positive 
effect in the number of coca bushes for both groups, which is the opposite expected effect. In 
this case, this could be related with less on-farm or off-farm opportunities outside the research 
area, given that those farmers might have restricted contacts in other regions. Therefore, they 
might have to rely on growing coca to supplement their income. On the other hand, reciprocal 
farmers (those who participate in reciprocal labor and have a sense of obligation to offer coca 
to their agricultural guesses as a reciprocity signal) do not grow less number of coca bushes. 
This  could  be  related  with  a  replication  effect  of  reciprocity  (detrimental  responses  to 
detrimental actions of others), although those variables did not show significant effects on the 
number of coca bushes.  
 
c)  Crime and Punishment Model 
As expected risk aversion shows a statistically significantly negative influence on the number 
of coca bushes for both groups, although, also as expected, the effect is larger in the case of 
the  commercial  group.  The  morality  index  only  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  case  of 
traditional coca farmers: higher morale is associated with lower number of coca bushes. On 
the other hand, perceived importance to obey the law does not have a significant effect on the 
number  of  coca  bushes,  and  it  only  shows  the  expected  negative  sign  for  the  case  of 
traditional growers. Both morality index and perceived importance to obey the law showed a 
positive influence, but highly insignificant for the commercial farmers, suggesting that their 
behavior  is  indifferent  to  changes  in  these  variables.  Religious  belief,  measured  as  being 
catholic, negatively influence the number of coca bushes for the traditional group. Religion, 
or the social gatherings associated with it, seems to play a role on coca growing decisions.   27
Ibanez and Carlsson (2009) in a similar way found a positive influence of being protestant 
with farmers’ coca areas. 
 
Interestingly,  the  frequency  of  attendance  to  religious  meetings  significantly  positively 
influences that number of coca bushes for both groups. This could be related to the perverse 
social capital formation – the ability to obtain resources through networks or other social 
structures  that  benefit  vicious  behaviors  -  that  could  be  reinforced  during  those  social 
gatherings, more than with an issue of faith. In relation to fear of eradication, this variable has 
negative influence in the number of coca bushes, but this effect is non significant. This makes 
sense considering that this is practically a new coca region for narcotraffic business, and have 
been never subject to eradication efforts. 
  
d)  Other Factors beyond the Profit Maximization Rationale 
The positive effect of risk aversion given than coca growing reduces agricultural uncertainties 
as suggested by Revilla (1993) was not evidenced in our case. On the other hand, having a 
debt with the co-operative significantly increases the number of coca bushes grown by the 
traditional  group.  Compulsory  celebrations  during  the  last  two  years  show  a  significant 
positive effect on the number of coca bushes cultivated by both groups.  
 
An important variable that need further discussion is education. As expected, this variable has 
a significant negative influence on the number of coca bushes but only for the traditional 
group. On the contrary, education shows a positive and significant effect for the commercial 
group. One of the possible reasons for this result could be that the latter group manages their 
farm in a more  commercial oriented manner, and are in average more educated than the 
traditional group (see Table 5). Thus, increases on education for this latter group could have 
the spillover effect of increasing the ability to manage their farm in a more efficient way, 
probably meaning more coca bushes, given their profitability. Here, we also have to take into 
account  that  there  have  not  being  any  forced  eradication  program  implementation  in  the 
research area and that farmers in the commercial group are in average less risk averse than the 
ones in the traditional group (see Table 5).  Ibanez and Carlsson (2009) also found a positive 
relation  between  coca  growing  and  education  in  Colombia,  and  suggested  that  the  coca 
growing parents have more money to educate their children who become coca growers too. 
This  option  is  probably  ruled  out  in  our  case,  given  that  coca  growing  for  narcotraffic 
business is a relatively new activity in our research area.   28
 
The set of variables that have not significant effect both in the likelihood of growing coca or 
the number of coca bushes cultivated by the farmers are being male (probably due to the small 
number  of  female  responses),  planning  to  increase  coffee  areas,  security  or  communal 
activities. Trust in neighbors has a significant positive effect on the number of coca bushes 
but  only  for  the  traditional  group,  suggesting  that  for  this  group,  perverse  social  capital 
formation – the ability to obtain resources through networks or other social structures that 
benefit  vicious  behaviors-  could  have  taken  place.  This  also  resembles  the  positive  and 
significant effect of trust in the areas of coca obtained by Ibanez and Carlsson (2009). 
 
4.3  Does de latent class separation make sense?  
It is expected that the farmers classified under  the traditional group will have significant 
different socio – economic characteristics than the farmers classified under the commercial 
group, and that those differences should correspond to an associated behavior for each group. 
For example, traditional growers are expected to have less number of coca bushes than the 
commercial ones, given that they are supposed to grow coca mostly for self-consumption. At 
the same time, traditional farmers are supposed to have less education than the commercial 
ones,  as  suggested  by  the  DEVIDA  (2004).    Table  5  shows  the  statistically  significantly 
different characteristics of those groups based on sample t-tests. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Latent Class Group 
Variable  Traditional  Commercial 




























Sample t test reveal significant differences between the two groups at:  
* 0.1% level, ** 0.05% level, and ***0.01% level 
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In  general, the results above support the expected characteristics of the traditional versus 
commercial coca farmers. The traditional group has statistically significant less number of 
coca bushes, less education, more number of children, and are more risk averse than the 
commercial group. The former group has also significantly larger total area (in log), but are 
located further from the road, and seem to consider more important to obey the law than the 
commercial group. It is worth mention the traditional group seems to include mostly farmers 
who grow coca only for self-consumption, but it also includes farmers who sell it, given the 
relative large average number of coca bushes.  
 
4.4  Policy Implications  
In  Peru  and  Bolivia,  the  area  under  coca  bush  cultivation  has  increased  for  the  third 
consecutive year. Larger increments in coca cultivation have been observed in previously only 
traditional coca growing regions, such as our research area (UNODC, 2009). Moreover, our 
particular study region is of strategic interest for narcotraffic business, because it is located at 
the border with Bolivia, and therefore provides an access to an external exit route (UNODC 
Office in Peru, 1999). The Peruvian Government is particularly focusing its anti-drug policy 
programs in preventing the expansion of coca bush cultivation in this and other regions in the 
country (INCB, 2010). Anti - drug policy recommendations are formulated below, suggesting 
the overall effect that the policy could have in our research area and similar ones. Weighted 
marginal effects for selected significant variables of the latent class model were constructed 
and are presented in Table 6.  
 




Standard Error  p-value 




(0.242)  0.0031 
Organic  -0.574* 
 
(0.334)  0.0860 
Time to road  -0.012*** 
 
(0.004)  0.0004 
Education   0.138** 
 
(0.062)  0.0 
 
Proud of being coffee farmer has a large and significant negative effect in the number of coca 
bushes grown by the farmers. Importantly, this negative effect is observed in both groups of 
coca growers (see Table 4). The coffee co-operatives could help to enhance pride among their 
members by coffee quality contests, motivational talks during General Assemblies to increase   30
awareness of coffee farmer identity, celebrations associated with coffee farmer’s heritage, or 
any  other  associated  activity  that  could  raise  feelings  of  self  -  respect  among  the  coffee 
farmers.   
 
In addition, organic certification also seems to have an overall negative effect on the number 
of coca bushes, although for the traditional group, our results suggest that organic certification 
has a positive effect, which as already mentioned could be related with the coca function as 
refuge crop as farmers become permanent settlers in rainforest areas. This positive effect is 
overcome by the larger negative effect on the commercial  group. On the other hand and 
contrary to what is expected, road construction and education seems to positively influence 
the number of coca bushes in the research area. These latter results could be of temporal 
nature, given that road construction reduces transactions costs first for coca and then for other 
agricultural crops (see Lupu, 2004), and education enhances the quality of life of the farmers. 
Therefore, both on the long term should have positive effects on the community well-being, 
which could translate into a potential reduction on coca areas. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the joint decision to grow coca and the number of coca bushes 
cultivated by indigenous farmers in a rainforest community located in Peru, at the border with 
Bolivia. This community did not show significant quantities of coca bushes under cultivation 
until recently, and currently is one of the coca growing regions with the largest increases on 
coca areas in the country, given its proximity to an external exit route. Thus, it is very likely 
that  in  this  region  traditional  (mostly  self-consumption)  coca  growers  and  commercial  – 
oriented coca growers co-exist. Each of group is supposed to have different motivations to 
grow coca and therefore should follow different distribution functions.  
 
A preliminary statistical evaluation of the data indicated that the Cragg model performed 
better than the Tobit and Heckman or sample selection models. A probit for the decision to 
grow coca, followed by a Cragg model for the decision of the number of coca bushes under 
cultivation were used for the analysis; first, considering the farmers as homogenous group, 
and  then  relaxing  this  assumption  and  assuming  heterogeneity.  For  the  heterogeneity 
evaluation, a latent class Cragg model specification was used, given that this type of model 
allows the analyst/researcher to separate the farmers into two or more classes with different   31
parameter  estimates.  The  latent  class  Cragg  model  performed  statistically  better  than  the 
standard Cragg model.    
 
Our results suggest that there is unobserved heterogeneity among the coca growers. Thus, 
based on this unobserved heterogeneity, farmers could be classified in two groups called for 
convenience “traditional” and “commercial”. Traditional farmers represent around 35% of the 
sample and have smaller coca areas. They seem to grow coca mostly due to poverty. Larger 
total  agricultural  plot  areas,  more  availability  of  family  labor,  better  quality  of  soil,  and 
shorter distance to the road have a negative statistically effect on their number of coca bushes 
for this group. On the other hand, for the commercial coca growers represent the remaining 
65%  of  the  sample  and  have  significant  larger  coca  areas  than  the  other  group.  Larger 
agricultural plot areas, better quality of soil, shorter distance to the road, and smaller areas of 
coffee have a positive and significant effect on their number of coca bushes. This latter group 
seems to have a commercial oriented management of their farm by destining the better land to 
coca production, and balancing their coffee areas according to their extension of coca.  
 
On the other hand, our results also suggest that increases in the pride of being coffee growers 
and organic coffee certification would statistically significantly reduce the number of coca 
bushes  in  the  overall  region.  On  the  contrary,  other  common  anti-drug  policies  such  as 
education and road constructions have a significant and positive effect on the number of coca 
bushes, at least on the short term, although given that they increase the quality of life of the 
community, it could be expected that in the long term those types of policies would lead to a 
sustainable reduction on the number of coca bushes. This paper has just scratched the surface 
about the motivations of coca growers, and more research is needed, which should include the 
use of panel data, to be able to recommend sound anti-drug policies that are urgently needed 
in benefit of the overall society.      32
Appendix 
 
This is a game. Before playing it, you need to choose one of the options displayed below. Then I 
toss a coin. If for example you have chosen option H, and I toss the coin and it is heads, you do 
not win any money at all; but if it is tails, you win S/.200. On the other hand, if you have chosen 
option A, you receive S/.50 regardless if the tossed coin is heads or tails. Which option from all of 
the above would you choose before I toss the coin?  
 
OPTION  If it is heads, you win:  If it is tails, you win: 
A  50 soles  50 soles 
B  45 soles  95 soles 
C  40 soles  120 soles 
D  35 soles  125 soles 
E  30 soles  150 soles 
F  20 soles  160 soles 
G  10 soles  190 soles 
H  0 soles  200 soles 
 
Table conversion: 
A-B: High risk aversion 
C-F: Medium risk aversion 
G-H: Low risk aversion 
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